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James Kurth 
The Common Defense and the World 
Market 
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY HAS WITNESSED THE Culmination of 
the tension between national security and the global econ 
omy. In the first half of the century, two world wars wonder 
fully concentrated the minds of governments on the primacy of 
national security. In the second half of the century, one government 
after another was persuaded to accept the primacy of the global 
economy. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact marked the decisive 
retreat of the last great power that had been resisting the spread of the 
global economy. As we enter the last decade of our century, it seems 
that the epic struggle between national security and the global 
economy may be coming to an end, with the decisive submission of 
the former to the latter. 
The tension between national security and the global economy has 
been evident for many centuries, reflected in the Portuguese adven 
tures in Asia and Africa and the Spanish adventures in the New 
World.1 By the seventeenth century, national monarchies had devel 
oped a broad array of instruments?navigation acts, chartered mo 
nopolies, and state arsenals, among others?by which the state drew 
benefits from a growing global trade. By the eighteenth century, these 
had been institutionalized into a systematic theory and practice, 
which we know as mercantilism. 
Mercantilism is usually seen as a systematic policy of favoring 
domestic producers in the interests of national security. Yet, as the 
chapter by Moravcsik illustrates, national monarchies normally 
engaged in a lively international trade in armaments. In many cases, 
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military security and international trade went together, linked by the 
search for economic efficiency. That link has persisted through the 
vast transformations brought on by the Industrial Revolution and by 
the globalization of the world economy. 
RESPONDING TO THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 
Over the centuries, national governments have framed their policies 
in response to their need for security and economic welfare. On the 
eve of the Industrial Revolution, all the great powers of the time? 
Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia?were under the control 
of monarchies and were dominated by mercantilist policies. In those 
circumstances, national security and economic welfare were indistin 
guishable, different aspects of a single objective. There were, how 
ever, great differences in degree among the five powers. The state in 
which the monarchy was least authoritarian and the parliament most 
autonomous was Britain; accordingly, Britain was also the state in 
which the economy was least controlled by the state, entrepreneurs 
were under the least restraints, and foreign trade was most promi 
nent. As one moved eastward from Britain to France, Austria, 
Prussia, and Russia the monarchy became successively more absolut 
ist and the economy successively more mercantilist.2 
The Industrial Revolution reinforced the differences along the 
West-East continuum, according to a pattern that was first systemat 
ically articulated by Alexander Gerschenkron.3 In the first industrial 
izing state, Great Britain, business enterprises led the transformation. 
Having nothing to fear from international competition in industrial 
products, the British soon abandoned the mercantilist approach and 
developed the doctrine and policy of free trade. Industrialization also 
brought advantages in military competition, particularly in naval 
development. Global trade was seen, therefore, as contributing both to 
security and to economic welfare, which in any case were inseparably 
linked. 
Later industrializing states faced more formidable economic and 
military problems. For one thing, lacking the shielding from enemies 
that Britain enjoyed from the sea, they were obliged to maintain large 
standing armies; but that was not enough. In order to compete in 
foreign markets or to prevail in military conflicts, they needed to 
catch up with the early industrializers. One urgent need was to find 
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a way of mobilizing large amounts of capital in a short time for 
investment in modern plants. For France and Prussia, this meant a 
banking system closely linked to the state; and for Russia and Japan, 
the state itself. Meanwhile, until they achieved their goal of catch-up, 
these countries needed to provide protection for their infant indus 
tries. Consequently, eschewing free trade, they developed doctrines 
and policies for guiding the development of the national economy. 
Inside Europe, therefore, the role of the state as the arbiter between 
national security and economic efficiency was at its lowest in Britain 
to the west, and at its highest in Russia to the east. Further to the 
west, in the United States, the role of the state was even more limited. 
And further to the east, in Japan, the state exercised extensive 
authority in bringing about economic development. In Japan, the 
necessity to build a strong navy reinforced the need for government 
support of rapid industrialization in heavy industry. 
The first half of the twentieth century would be one of the most 
tumultuous eras in world history. During that period, national 
security in most countries became a dominant concern. But it was not 
until after the close of World War II in 1945 that the relative roles of 
governments changed in these countries, disturbing the West-East 
continuum. 
With the defeat of Germany and Japan, and the exhaustion of 
Britain and France, four of the great powers were demoted from 
great power status to merely being major states. The remaining two, 
the United States and the Soviet Union, were elevated to the new rank 
of superpower. The new West Germany allowed for far less govern 
ment direction of the economy for purposes of national security than 
had the old Germany. Conversely, the United States, now engaged in 
a long Cold War, tolerated somewhat more direction from the state 
than it had in the past. And Japan, while retaining strong government 
direction of its economy, developed a completely new definition of 
national security. 
SECURING THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE 
When national policy makers have seen the global economy as a 
threat to the security of the national defense industrial base, they have 
employed a variety of policy responses. Borrowing from the analysis 
in the Friedberg essay, I see their responses as falling into three 
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groups: providing measures of protection, such as import barriers; 
providing measures of promotion, such as subsidies; and developing 
measures of prevention, such as export controls. 
Policies of protection in the narrow, traditional sense are familiar 
enough. It might seem that protection would be an obvious policy 
choice for governments to secure their defense industrial base. Yet, as 
the Moravcsik essay demonstrates, governments have often pur 
chased weapons produced in other countries if these were demon 
strably superior to those produced at home. 
When choosing foreign weapons, the military services of course 
have been opposed by the domestic weapons producers. In conflicts 
between military and business organizations, national governments 
generally have supported the military. In such cases, the global 
economy has been seen as reinforcing national security. 
But the willingness of governments to buy abroad has undergone 
cycles of change. In the immediate aftermath of great wars, including 
the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, and World War II, national 
governments have been more inclined to buy from national sources. 
In such periods, there has been an especially large defense industrial 
base left over from the wartime expansion. As a great war has 
receded into the past, however, the defense sector has tended to lose 
its economic importance, making it easier for the military services to 
return to the international market. Even in normal times, however, 
some governments have been more inclined than others to protect 
their defense industrial base. As Christopher Davis relates, the Soviet 
Union has represented the extreme case of government protection 
and promotion, even at the cost of ruining its civilian and commercial 
industry. But France and Japan have also been strongly disposed to 
protect their defense industry. These two countries, it is worth noting, 
are the two capitalist powers with the strongest tradition of govern 
ment guidance of the economy, the "strong states" of the compara 
tive politics literature. So it is not surprising to find that they are also 
the countries with the most explicit plans for developing a national 
structure appropriate for their national security. 
Japan, as described in the Samuels essay, represents an especially 
remarkable case of linking national development to national security. 
In the first decades of Japan's industrialization, the Japanese govern 
ment actively promoted the "indigenization" of technology, along with 
a national defense industry. This provided the model for an industrial 
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policy that since World War II has promoted civilian and commercial 
industry. Indeed, by promoting commercial production from the 
1950s to the 1980s, the government incidentally brought Japan's 
industry to a state that has served especially well in the contemporary 
era of high-technology, electronics-based weapons systems. 
The leading example of a policy of prevention has been the 
development and implementation of national export controls. Gov 
ernments have applied such policies only infrequently in peacetime. 
But as the Mastanduno essay recounts, the United States pushed such 
policies hard after World War II, persuading its allies to join in an 
elaborate system of multilateral controls directed against the com 
munist bloc. These controls, "the American style of economic war 
fare," had their origins in World War II and were readily carried over 
into the Cold War. The intensity and duration of the Cold War 
institutionalized US export controls so that they persisted even into 
the era of economic globalization. Even before the Gulf War aborted 
Iraq's systematic attempt to develop weapons of mass destruction, 
systems of control over the proliferation of nuclear weapons were 
already on the books, and proposals for the control of chemical 
weapons were well advanced. There is evidence that the United States 
will continue to promote such controls long after the Cold War has 
been forgotten. 
These disparate national policies, however, need to be seen in their 
larger national contexts. 
THE UNITED STATES: THE LIBERAL STATE 
The 1940s were the heroic age of US foreign policy. The United States 
first achieved an epic triumph in World War II and then set about to 
create a new world order in its own image. This new order was a 
splendid example of enlightened self-interest, of Gramscian "hege 
mony," in which a leading class or power creatively conceives of its 
own self-interest in terms so broad and so generous that it brings the 
willing assent of those that it leads. Even today, when much of this 
structure has fallen into ruins and its foundations have greatly 
eroded, the grandeur of the original architecture still inspires awe. 
International Liberalism and Extended Deterrence 
The new American order embraced two central concepts, one 
applying to the global economy, the other to global security. The 
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global economy was to be based upon the idea of international 
liberalism: liberal states, particularly those in North America and 
Western Europe, would support market forces in an open interna 
tional economy. This might be termed the GATT model, after the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which was established in 
1948. Global security was to be based upon the idea of extended 
deterrence, that is, a collective undertaking to respond with nuclear 
weapons if necessary to any Soviet attack on the United States or on 
the territory of its allies. This might be termed the NATO model, 
after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which was established 
in 1949. 
The two concepts of international liberalism and extended deter 
rence, the two models of GATT and NATO, thus filled out the 
economic and security dimensions of the new international order. For 
more than four decades, Americans have taken them for granted, 
almost as if they were "self-evident truth." 
But, in fact, these two concepts together have represented no more 
than an Atlantic perception of a world order. The concepts of 
international liberalism and extended deterrence developed out of the 
conditions in the areas within the US-led Atlantic alliance, areas that 
dominated the global economy and world politics after World War 
II. As we have seen, both concepts had been prefigured in the earlier 
economic and security policies of Britain, especially during the 
century of "the hundred years peace" between the Napoleonic Wars 
and World War I. True, Britain was already abandoning such policies 
before World War II. But as the United States assumed the British 
role after the war, it also assumed some of the ideas historically 
identified with the Pax Britannica; ideas that came readily to nations 
with commercial economies, liberal polities, and strong navies.4 
The economic and military advantages that the United States 
enjoyed in the early postwar years reinforced these historical legacies. 
In the late 1940s, the United States accounted for 50 percent of the 
world's industrial output, and was the world leader in high-technol 
ogy products and high-productivity processes. In addition, in 1945 
the United States had a monopoly in nuclear weapons and an 
overwhelming preponderance of naval forces. For a country in such 
a happy condition, international liberalism and extended deterrence 
were policies of choice. Besides, no other country was in a position to 
press strongly for an alternative. 
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When globalization was extended from the Atlantic region to the 
Pacific, however, the American concepts of international liberalism 
and extended deterrence no longer received such willing assent. The 
restoration of Japan was led by a national bureaucracy that, sup 
ported by its trading complexes and banks, had retained and even 
strengthened its prewar position. Japan developed an alternative 
economic concept, one that can be termed international mercantil 
ism, and developed an alternative security concept, one that the 
Japanese call "comprehensive security"?that is, security based prin 
cipally on economic power and commercial competitiveness.5 
From Economic Welfare to National Security 
In the first few years after World War II, the United States hoped to 
support its new international order with its old national priorities, 
that is, with its prime emphasis being economic welfare and having 
minimal spending on national security. By 1949, US defense spending 
had fallen to 3 percent of GNP, and its massive defense industry had 
shrunk back to but a saving remnant. 
Already by that time, however, the United States was taking official 
cognizance of the Cold War. Thereafter, the Soviet acquisition of 
nuclear weapons, the communist victory in China, and the Korean 
War elevated national defense once again to a dominant theme in US 
policy. For the first time in history, US military forces were perma 
nently stationed abroad, notably in West Germany and South Korea. 
Military spending sprang back to high levels, ranging between 9 and 
12 percent of GNP from 1954 to 1964. And the establishment of a 
large defense industrial base became a permanent object of US policy. 
The US government also institutionalized, through CoCom, an 
elaborate system of controls on exports of weapons and technology 
to communist countries. Although export controls were a direct 
contradiction of international liberalism, and the CoCom model was 
the antithesis of the GATT model, both were to operate side by side 
in the four decades to follow. 
From American Superiority to Global Competition 
The extraordinarily competitive position of the US economy in the 
1940s and the 1950s helped the country to pursue an active policy 
overseas. It provided a healthy base for federal taxes and federal 
This content downloaded from 130.58.65.13 on Wed, 17 Jun 2015 16:30:35 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
214 James Kurth 
spending, and it financed large-scale expenditures on extended deter 
rence, the deployment of US military forces overseas, and extensive 
foreign aid programs. Prosperity was underwriting peace, providing 
the Eisenhower administration with its familiar slogan, "peace and 
prosperity." 
When West European countries and Japan reentered world mar 
kets in the 1950s, however, US industry felt their presence almost at 
once. At first they rebuilt their old industries, including textiles, steel, 
shipbuilding, and chemicals. Soon, however, they moved into newer 
areas, including automobiles and electronics. In these initial phases, 
countries such as West Germany and Japan employed the advantages 
of latecomers in their production processes, that is, lower wages and 
more modern equipment than their counterparts located within the 
United States. Especially during the 1960s and 1970s, US industry's 
share of global markets underwent a severe erosion. To US planners, 
global trade competition, the first dimension of the globalization 
process, now seemed to be undermining US national security. 
Adding to the US sense of slippage in the postwar period was the 
Soviet Union's achievements in space travel and the expansion of its 
own formidable industries devoted to military production. That 
expansion was especially pronounced in tanks and tactical aircraft, 
the country's winning weapons in the land battles of World War II. 
The conditions of extended deterrence and international liberalism 
brought about the second dimension of the globalization process, the 
spread of the multinational enterprise. The US alliance system, 
especially NATO, encouraged a massive flow of American direct 
investment into other countries, especially into Europe. Multina 
tional enterprises operated in larger numbers, on a greater scale, and 
in more countries than ever before. 
In terms of national objectives, however, that development was 
seen by policy makers as having equivocal results. The multinationals 
certainly benefited greatly from their freedom to roam the noncom 
munist world, but there was considerable uncertainty whether US 
national security or economic welfare did as well.6 
The European subsidiaries of US-based multinationals eventually 
began to sell their output not only to members of NATO but also to 
members of the Warsaw Pact. European host governments resisted 
the efforts of the US government to extend its export restrictions to 
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the subsidiaries of US firms established in Europe, generating such 
nasty quarrels as the struggle over the provisioning of the Soviet 
pipeline in 1982.7 
Multinational enterprises helped to accelerate a third dimension of 
globalization, the spread of high-technology capabilities. US-based 
multinationals began to acquire components for US weapons systems 
not only from their US plants but also from subsidiaries and 
independent suppliers abroad. The new reality was summed up in 
1987 by the commander of US military forces in the Pacific, Admiral 
James Lyons: 
All of the critical components of our modern weapon systems, which 
involve our F-16s and F/A-18s, our M-l tanks, our military comput 
ers?and I could go on and on?come from East Asian industries. I 
don't see change in that, during the foreseeable future. Some day, we 
might view that with concern, and rightly so. Certainly, the East Asian 
industries have really become an extension of our own military 
industrial complex.8 
From Military Spin-offs to Commercial Drain-off s 
The institutionalization of high military spending in peacetime that 
took place after the Korean War helped to establish a large defense 
industrial base,9 and also had an important impact upon the com 
mercial performance of the US economy as a whole. But this impact 
would change over time. 
For the first decade or so, the impact of military spending upon 
economic performance seemed rather positive. First, there was the 
fiscal or macroeconomic effect: as long as fiscal resources were 
plentiful, military purchases could be sustained even in recessions, 
reducing their duration and severity. Besides, military spending on 
new weapons technologies seemed to be helping the US government 
to lift the national economy to higher stages of development; military 
innovations, for instance, were spun off to support aviation in the 
1940s and 1950s, computers in the 1950s, and semiconductors in the 
1960s. 
By the early 1970s, however, the benefits of military spending 
upon economic performance had become dubious. The fiscal effect of 
the Vietnam War had been to drive the US economy into an era of 
sustained inflation. Military spending was beginning to divert inno 
vators from products and processes most suited to commercial use to 
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the more exotic and expensive needs of the battlefield. The diversion 
was evident in semiconductors, as the Ziegler analysis points out, and 
was also apparent in other key industries including machine tools. 
By the early 1980s, the impact of military spending upon economic 
performance had become largely negative. The Reagan administra 
tion undertook a new military buildup, bringing military spending 
from 5 or 6 percent of GNP in the 1970s to 7 percent in 1985. 
Although the increase was modest in relation to GNP, it was piled up 
on top of high fiscal deficits, giving rise to the accumulation of more 
federal debt in the Reagan years than in the two preceding centuries. 
For a time in the 1980s, interest rates and a high valuation of the 
dollar contributed to a further weakening of US exports in the global 
market.10 
One part of the Reagan administration's military program, how 
ever, seemed to give some promise of a different result. A few 
advocates of the Strategic Defense Initiative hoped that it could also 
serve as a US version of the industrial policies of foreign competitors, 
particularly those of Japan, thereby repeating the role that military 
contracts had performed earlier in the fields of aviation, computers, 
and semiconductors. But any hope for a new golden age of military 
spin-offs to commercial competitiveness was extinguished by the 
drive to hold down military spending in response to the fiscal deficit. 
Meanwhile, through the four decades of the postwar period, the 
country's principal allies were spending far less for military purposes 
than the United States, exposing themselves to the charge that they 
were playing the role of the free rider. By the 1970s, a negative 
relationship became evident between the level of military expenditure 
and the change in industrial competitiveness: the lower the level of 
military expenditure, the stronger the competitive performance. The 
resulting array placed West Germany and Japan at the top of the 
growth league, and the United States and the United Kingdom at the 
bottom. Despite some recovery in the US performance in subsequent 
years, the array continued largely unchanged. 
The United States, it was evident, was the linchpin in the security 
system on which other countries relied after World War II. Britain 
and France were reduced from great power status and military 
autonomy to merely being major powers within a US-led alliance. 
This condition of dependence upon a US defense was even more true 
of the defeated nation-states, Germany and Japan. But in all these 
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countries, a new conception was developing of how its national 
security was related to the international economy.11 This conception 
shaped the policies that each government would pursue toward its 
defense industrial base. 
BRITAIN 
At the end of World War II, Britain continued in many ways to give 
the appearance of a great power. It still governed the largest colonial 
empire in the world; was one of the big three at the Potsdam 
conference; was one of the four victors sharing in the occupation of 
Germany; and was one of the five permanent members of the United 
Nations Security Council. But the reality was quite different. Britain 
had been economically exhausted by its wartime efforts, as was 
revealed in July 1945, when the British government had to appeal for 
a large emergency loan from the United States. By 1947, economic 
necessity forced the British to withdraw from being the main support 
of the Greek government in its effort against communist insurgents. 
Britain's withdrawal led first to the Truman Doctrine and then the 
Marshall Plan. 
For forty years thereafter, the essence of British security policy was 
an effort to sustain British interests with American power. From the 
British perspective, the ideal "special relationship" was one between 
British ends and American means, British brains and American 
brawn. This special relationship was bolstered by a number of 
different factors: a common language and culture, a liberal-capitalist 
economy, and a liberal-democratic polity as well as the shared 
experiences of resisting Germany in two world wars and the Soviet 
Union in a cold peace. 
In 1952, Britain developed an independent nuclear deterrent and 
became a third nuclear power. But the independence of the deter 
rent was only nominal. Since 1962 the British nuclear deterrent 
has consisted of US-made ballistic missiles placed within British 
submarines. 
The policies of the British government toward the British defense 
industry have generally conformed to the pattern suggested by the 
role of junior partner in a special relationship. The British defense 
budget percentage has been the second largest after that of the United 
States, running at 4 or 5 percent of GNP. But the British market has 
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not been large enough to sustain an efficient defense industrial base. 
For many years, the British defense industry found a natural market 
in the former members of the Empire, principally the sheikdoms of 
the Persian Gulf. But this was still not enough to sustain an industry 
on the required scale. Accordingly, as the Moran-Mowery essay 
recounts, by the late 1960s the British were engaged in joint 
production arrangements with the military aircraft industries of other 
countries, including France and West Germany. By the 1980s the 
British government was sufficiently relaxed with regard to the need 
for military autonomy that it allowed US firms to take over the 
country's leading producer of military helicopters.12 
FRANCE 
At the end of World War II, the gap between the appearance of great 
power status and the reality of economic weakness was even greater 
for France than for Britain. France had also been exhausted by the 
war, but the reason lay in something far more demoralizing than 
what had happened to Britain, namely, France's defeat and occupa 
tion by Germany. For a time, the personality of Charles de Gaulle as 
commander of the Free French gave the illusion of a victorious 
France. Besides, with the close of World War II, France still governed 
the second largest colonial empire in the world; was one of the four 
powers sharing in the occupation of Germany; and was one of the 
five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. But 
because of the reality of its defeat, France was even weaker than 
Britain in the essentials of economic and military power; and much of 
what remained would be consumed in the long and disastrous 
colonial wars in Indochina from 1945 to 1954 and in Algeria from 
1954 to 1962. Balking at every step, France nevertheless had to take 
its place within the US security system. 
Out of office during most of these years, de Gaulle perceived this 
reality clearly, and when he returned to power in 1958, he quickly set 
about to reverse it. De Gaulle's France represented a sort of Indian 
summer of the nation-state, a reminder of what it had been in the lost 
era before World War II and the ascendancy of the superpowers. 
De Gaulle saw that the keystone of the nation-state was military 
autonomy; thus his insistence on an independent nuclear force, his 
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force de frappe, as well as his withdrawal from the integrated NATO 
structure commanded by an American general. 
An independent nuclear force, in turn, required a strong defense 
industrial base?a French military-industrial complex. The chief 
components of this were a large aerospace industry and a large 
nuclear industry; supporting it was a French defense budget that 
normally has been 3 or 4 percent of GNP. But economies of scale of 
course meant that these industries would not be efficient unless their 
markets were larger than what France alone could provide. This 
required a major emphasis on the export of weapons systems and 
nuclear power plants, which often went to Third World countries, 
including those in the former colonial empire and Iraq. But France 
still could not sustain a weapons industry on the required scale. 
Accordingly, like Britain, France was driven to engage in joint 
production arrangements with the weapons industries of other 
countries. 
Since the de Gaulle era, French governments have continued to 
give a higher priority than have Britain and West Germany to 
maintaining a domestic aerospace industry and nuclear industry. But 
the differences have now shrunk to a matter of degree. 
WEST GERMANY 
Before World War II, Germany had been the ?xtreme example of the 
"military-political" state in Europe, of the state applying military 
power to gain economic space.13 After World War II, Germany was 
reduced first to being an occupied country and eventually to a nation 
with restricted sovereignty. 
As a military state, Germany had been distinguished by the superb 
organization of its military into an effective force. After its defeat, the 
country redirected its national capacity for organization and disci 
pline and instead became an exemplary "trading state." 
For a number of reasons, the allies did not leave a centralized 
bureaucracy to lead the new West Germany as they did in Japan. In 
West Germany, the powers of the federal government were held in 
check by some basic structural changes, including an expansion of 
the powers of state and local governments and the development of a 
central bank insulated from the federal government's authority. 
What was left of the national leadership were the same forces that 
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had led German industrial development in the past, the major banks 
and corporations. These great organizations returned to become 
leading forces in the German economy, devoted to economic effi 
ciency and commercial success. 
When the West German army was reestablished in 1955, it was 
integrated into a NATO framework under an American commander. 
The West German armed forces acted as if they were part of the US 
army, and had no independent political purpose or strategic doctrine. 
With so limited a role, West German governments succeeded in 
holding down military spending to only 3 percent of GNP. 
During its first decade, the West German military bought many of 
its weapons systems from the United States. Eventually, West Ger 
many reestablished its own defense industry, but it was one that 
remained relatively modest in comparison with that in the United 
States, Britain, and France. Being too small for efficient production 
and not having available an ex-colonial market into which to expand, 
the German defense industry moved even more quickly and more 
completely than its British and French counterparts into joint pro 
duction with the defense industries of other NATO allies. 
Having made its peace with the rest of Europe, in West Germany 
no institution developed a concept of national identity or even of 
national security as they normally would be defined. The military had 
a NATO orientation; the banks and corporations had a Common 
Market or European orientation; and the bureaucracies had a 
number of diverse orientations?European, federal, and state. This 
absence of a German orientation was of course reinforced by the fact 
that East Germany lay outside its orbit. With the advent in 1990 of 
a unified German state, one condition for the development of a 
distinctly German orientation was again in place. A question for the 
future will be what institution or interest is likely to provide the 
leadership for a German concept of national security. 
JAPAN: THE MERCANTILIST STATE 
Japan offers some striking parallels to the West German experience: 
a state that had been defeated in its efforts to use military force to 
gain economic space; a nation with a high propensity for organiza 
tion and discipline, turning that capacity to economic ends; and a 
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nation prepared to live comfortably with less than the full trappings 
of national sovereignty. 
Even more than West Germany, Japan has been the exemplar of a 
trading state, spending only 1 percent of its GNP upon defense. In 
Japan's transformation from military state to trading state in the 
postwar years, a crucial role was played by the US Occupation. The 
Americans dismantled some of the central institutions of the old 
Japan?the army, the navy, and the zaibatsu, or industrial conglom 
erates. Unlike in Germany, however, the occupying powers did not 
dismantle the centralized bureaucracy.14 
The Japanese armed forces were replaced by the US armed forces, 
which assumed some of the roles that the Japanese military would 
have performed. US forces bolstered the military security of Japan in 
the Korean War and guaranteed safe passage for Japanese goods 
going to Southeast Asia, as well as Indonesian and Middle Eastern oil 
coming to Japan. 
Without its own army and navy, Japan no longer had its own 
military strategy. By dismantling the industrial zaibatsu, if only in 
part, the occupation had also reduced a second pillar of authority. 
Yet another pillar remained from the earlier order, the bureaucracy. 
By relying on the bureaucracy for the actual administration of Japan 
during the occupation, the United States had further enhanced its 
role. With remnants of the conglomerates still in existence, an 
industrial structure existed that could interact effectively with the 
bureaucracy. At the conclusion of the occupation, the Japanese state 
was in an even better position than it had been before World War II 
to lead the Japanese society with a particular vision. That vision was 
a modern form of mercantilism. 
The only power that could have opposed the mercantilism of 
Japan was the United States. But it choose not to do so. Why the 
United States did not, when it was promoting liberalism and oppos 
ing mercantilism so vigorously in Europe, has been the subject? of 
considerable scholarly analysis. One reason was evident: in Asia, the 
United States had only one major ally to help it confront the 
communist regimes of China and the Soviet Union, and that was 
Japan. In any event, mercantilism remained intact in Japan, not 
showing any significant signs of change until the 1980s. 
The Japanese bureaucracy has conceived of the state as guiding 
society toward effective competition in the global economy, for the 
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purpose of increasing the power and wealth of the state and society. 
It has also regarded this competition as taking place within the 
context of a dynamic comparative advantage. Responding to the 
changing environment, the state's role has been seen as helping 
society to move progressively higher on the ladder of technology, 
abandoning low-wage industries for those with higher productivity. 
Because Japan could no longer provide for its national security 
with its own military, it had to construct a functional equivalent, 
using US military power and a style of low-posture diplomacy in the 
application of its economic power. This combination provided the 
forces supporting the Japanese concept of "comprehensive security." 
For Japan, then, national security has required the US military 
umbrella; but it has also required economic efficiency in the global 
market, an objective to which the state has been committed. In 
economic terms, this has meant returning to the policies of the 
national monarchies of two centuries ago, that is, to mercantilism; 
but it has required a much greater identification with the interna 
tional market than was required two centuries ago, producing what 
I have chosen to call international mercantilism. 
THE SOVIET UNION: THE MILITARY-POLITICAL STATE 
The most consistent example of a military-political state in modern 
times has been the Soviet Union. Before the Bolshevik Revolution, 
Russia had provided an extreme example of the pattern of late 
development, relying on state direction of the economy. After the 
revolution, as the Davis essay demonstrates, it became even more so. 
In the view of some observers, the entire Soviet Union was one 
gigantic defense industrial base or military-industrial complex. 
However, the Soviet system represented an unstable equilibrium. 
Undermining the apparent stability of the structure was a steady 
decline in its economic performance. Each successive decade from the 
1950s to the 1980s saw a decline in the rates of economic growth of 
the Soviet Union and its East European allies. And although the 
Soviet Union was a military-political state, rather than one commit 
ted to increasing trade and consumption, this economic failure 
undermined its political legitimacy.15 As it turned out, even an 
exemplar of the military-political state could not avoid the test of the 
global economy. 
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For the Soviet bloc, the 1950s were a decade that perfectly fit the 
Stalinist formula, resonating with a personality that had chosen 
"steel" for a pseudonym. It was a decade of forced-draft industrial 
ization, of rapid growth in heavy industries such as steel, chemicals, 
electricity, shipbuilding, and, of course, weapons of all sorts. It 
brought into being a large class of industrial workers, which was 
supposedly the suitable mass base for communist rule. 
Producing annual growth rates that often exceeded 6 percent, the 
Soviet state's impressive economic performance gave great legitimacy 
to the Soviet model. But the great project of steel communism was 
already reaching its limits, unable to deal effectively with the next 
demanding stage of development. 
The 1960s might be called the decade of Sputnik communism, 
after the dramatic success of the Sputnik space program in 1957. 
Now the emphasis was on high-technology industrialization. There 
was also a vast expansion of higher education and the creation of a 
large class of managers and professionals. Growth rates remained 
high in this period, 4 to 5 percent annually, but they were lower than 
they had been in the earlier decade and were not much above the 
growth rates in Western Europe. 
The 1970s might be called the decade of goulash communism, 
after Khrushchev's description of Kadar's Hungary, which he saw as 
something of a model. Now, the emphasis was on consumer-goods 
industrialization. In order to bring this about, the Soviet bloc opened 
itself to Western loans, investments, joint ventures, and licensing 
agreements, the first beachheads of the global economy. A prime 
example was the arrangement with the giant Italian enterprise, Fiat, 
to reorganize and expand Soviet production of the Lada automobile. 
By the 1970s, the annual growth rates of the Soviet bloc had fallen 
to 3 or 4 percent, and the new standard of legitimacy was virtually 
identical to one of the central values of the West, namely, that of 
consumerism. On this standard, the Soviet bloc was obviously at a 
marked disadvantage. 
Finally, the 1980s might be called the decade of yuppie commu 
nism. By then, the annual growth rates of the Soviet bloc economies 
had fallen to 1 or 2 percent, or even less. The communist regimes 
were no longer able to fulfill the promise of mass consumption, and 
they retreated to the promise of elite consumption, that is, consump 
tion by the "new class" of bureaucrats, managers, and professionals. 
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Throughout these four decades, the Soviet government continued 
to spend 15 to 20 percent of its GNP on the military, or what 
Khrushchev called the "metal-eaters." It maintained and expanded a 
massive defense industrial base at the cost of having only a feeble 
industrial base for producing competitive goods for the global 
market. But the standards of both political legitimacy and military 
efficiency were steadily shifting away from what the Soviets did best, 
building a steel economy without regard for consumer interests. The 
move from low-technology, mechanical, mass-produced armaments 
to high-technology, electronic, and precision weapons systems rep 
resented a shift from what the Soviets did best to what the Japanese 
and the Americans did best. 
As the Davis essay recounts, these developments led to crisis in the 
Soviet military-political state and to Gorbachev's unsuccessful efforts 
at reform. Finally, in 1989, the communist governments in Eastern 
Europe collapsed with a suddenness and completeness that aston 
ished the world. 
Each of the three dimensions of globalization?markets, technol 
ogy, and the structure of enterprises?contributed in some way to the 
crisis of the Soviet state and the collapse of the Soviet bloc. 
The globalization of markets increased the benefits of participating 
in an open economy and the costs of maintaining a closed bloc. With 
foreign trade, however, came a need for Western loans and invest 
ments, and a need to be attentive to Western economic advice. 
The globalization of high-technology capabilities widened the 
margin by which Soviet technologies lagged behind those of the 
United States and Western Europe, a condition that was disagreeable 
but familiar. But it also placed Soviet technology behind that of Japan 
and East Asia, a condition that was unprecedented and unacceptable. 
If even South Korea could surpass the Soviet bloc in technological 
achievement, the Soviet system was obviously in deep trouble. 
The globalization of enterprise structure did not mean the spread 
of multinational enterprises into the Soviet bloc, at least not at first. 
It did mean, however, the creation in capitalist countries of a class of 
corporate managers with international, even global values and styles, 
a class that the bureaucratic managers and professionals in the Soviet 
bloc were increasingly eager to join. 
Thus it was that the greatest military-political empire that the 
world has ever seen was overcome in the cresting tide of globaliza 
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tion. Deposing Gorbachev, its new leaders were commanding the 
oceans to be still. 
AFTER THE COLD WAR 
Gorbachev's efforts to end the Cold War appeared to mark the 
transition to a new stage in the tension between national security and 
the global economy. The globalization trend had been seen by some 
US planners as creating a serious problem for US national security. 
But with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the need for a US defense 
base also seemed greatly reduced. By undermining the Soviet mili 
tary-political state along with the US national defense industrial base, 
globalization appeared to provide a solution to the very problem it 
had created. 
Nevertheless, with the prosecution of the war in the Persian Gulf 
and the turmoil in Soviet leadership, some of the problems of 
globalization have returned in even greater strength. Although the 
Soviet capacity for conventional warfare is much impaired, Soviet 
nuclear capabilities cannot be ignored. Nor can the possibilities be 
disregarded of the appearance of new petty tyrants in the developing 
world. A critical question for the future is to identify what will be 
needed to maintain and strengthen the capabilities for dealing with 
such potential threats. 
Part of the answer is crystal clear. A national defense base can no 
longer suffice to provide that capability. During the Cold War era, 
only the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, 
were able to maintain enough control within and beyond their 
borders to claim the existence of a national defense base. But both 
have been losing their coercive influence on other countries. 
In the future the Soviet defense industrial base may continue to be 
national in important ways, but it will have to depend upon 
large-scale imports of technology from the global market if it is to 
have any acceptable degree of efficiency. The US defense base seems 
destined to follow the trend toward progressive international involve 
ment. 
The new era, therefore, will not be the era of the national defense 
industrial base, or even of the continental, European one. Rather, it 
will be the era of the global defense industrial pool. This pool will be 
fed by streams flowing in from many sources, from many nations. 
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And national governments will have to be satisfied with access to, 
rather than control of, the pool. 
How will national governments respond to this new era of the 
global defense industrial pool? For the European governments, the 
new era will not be so different from the old. Centuries of experience 
have inured them to some measure of dependence on foreign 
technologies, foreign products, and foreign firms. For the US govern 
ment, the new era will indeed be a new experience, to be endured 
with great reluctance. And for the Soviet Union, it will be a challenge 
of monumental proportions. 
Will any nation have real powers of coercion over other govern 
ments by virtue of its contributions to the global pool? The remnants 
of such power will probably continue to reside in the United States 
for some time to come. Beyond the United States, the only other 
candidate is Japan. There has been some recent speculation that 
Japan for political purposes might try to exploit its monopoly in 
some components that are especially desired by the US military. But 
the bargaining relationship between the Japanese and US govern 
ments covers many points of vulnerability for both economies. From 
the perspective of planners in the US Defense Department, who 
concentrate on the weapons procurement relationship, the relative 
bargaining power between themselves and their counterparts in the 
Japanese government may seem troubling at times. But from the 
perspective of the US president, and from the perspective of most 
Japanese officials, many bargaining components are involved in the 
relationship beyond those involving weapons procurement. These 
include Japan's heavy dependence on US and European markets, 
Japan's heavy financial stake in the industries and capital markets of 
those areas, and Japan's continued traditional vulnerabilities as a 
crowded island without natural resources. The capacity of either 
country to effectively threaten the other over vital issues continues to 
decline. 
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